The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal
Judges: Some Notes from History
Philip B. Kurlandt

Almost every generation since the founding of this nation has raised
the question, in one form or another, for good reasons and bad, whether
federal judges are removable from their offices by means other than
impeachment and for causes other than the commission of "high crimes
or misdemeanors." The issue has never been successfully framed for a
definitive resolution by the Supreme Court. Those who would bestow
a monopoly of constitutional construction on the Court have, therefore,
to face the problem without adequate judicial authority on which to
rest argument. Nor have the other branches of the national government, equally sworn to uphold the Constitution, afforded a clear
answer to the problem.
The materials collected in this article, largely from non-judicial
sources, are offered with the thought that a few pages of history may
be worth a Supreme Court dictum. For the issue has once again been
raised in the Senate. This time the objective of the legislators appears
to be benign. It does not derive from the conflicts engendered by an
unpopular judiciary. The bill introduced in the first session of the
91st Congress' had its origins in a bill offered in the 90th Congress and
j- Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
I S. 1506, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), may be taken as typical of several bills directed
toward the same end. It was introduced on March 12, 1969. Its provisions relevant to
the immediate inquiry are summarized by the Legislative Reference Service in this way:
Judicial Reform Act-Title I: Commission on judicial Disabilitiesand TenureEstablishes within the judicial branch of the Government a Commission on
Judicial Disabilities and Tenure composed of five members. Requires each
member be a judge of the United States who is in regular active service. Requires the Commission, at all times, to include at least two district judges, and
two circuit judges. Provides that all members be assigned to the Commission by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Makes the term of the Commission
four years.
Provides that the Commission shall promote the honorable and efficient administration of justice in the courts of the United States. Permits it to act to retire
or remove a judge only after an investigation and formal hearing in accordance
with the requirements of due process. Provides that a decision to remove a judge
for misconduct shall be subject to review by the Judicial Conference and ultimately by the Supreme Court by certiorari. Makes such proceedings confidential.
Enables the Commission to undertake an investigation of a judges [sic] physical
or mental fitness upon a report of any person. Gives the Commission necessary
powers such as the subpoena power, depositions, etc. Authorizes the payment of
fees and mileage of witnesses and provides that US. marshals shall serve
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in no way is it attributable to the successful foray against Mr. Justice
Fortas. Nevertheless the infamous Fortas affair may well contribute
to its enactment, despite the fact that the bill does not affect Supreme
Court Justices. Senator Tydings, the prime sponsor of the bill, has been
patently concerned only with the worthy objective of improvement
of the machinery for the administration of justice. His concern is with
the process not the substance of judicial litigation. His concern is
about the senile, the inebriate, and the corrupt judge rather than
those who have simply rendered decisions that have offended the sensitivities of executive and legislative officials. But it should be kept in
mind that tools created by the well-intentioned for beneficent uses
may fall into less worthy hands to be used for less appropriate ends.
If the Supreme Court is not directly touched by this proposed legislation, use and legitimation of this legislation will afford ample precedent for similar treatment of Supreme Court Justices. When dealing
with so fundamental and so fragile a notion as the independence of
the judiciary, one ought to tread warily lest the ultimate cost far
outweigh the immediate gains.
In any event, the defects of our national judiciary are not, to my
mind, attributable primarily to the faults of the removal process. For
every inebriate, senile, and malfeasant judge on the federal bench,
there are several dullards and sluggards immune from removal whatever new standards and machinery are offered. The essential problem
is to be found in the process that has made federal judicial appointments prime patronage plums to be awarded by Senators in
acknowledgement of party or personal loyalty. (At the highest level,
the patronage is the personal prerogative of the President.) As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter once noted in another context: 2 "Fit legislation
and fair adjudication are attainable. The ultimate reliance of society
for the proper fulfillment of both these august functions is to entrust
them only to those who are equal to their demands."
This is not to suggest that legislative alternatives to the appointment
process should be sought. It should be clear by now that differences
in the machinery for judicial selection have made little or no difference in the quality of the judiciary. Certainly the politics of the bar
associations offer no advantages over the politics of our elected
officials. A combination of the two is likely to provide only exacerbaprocess and execute orders for the Commission.
Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., LEoss. Rm.
A-97 (1969).

Smv.

There are obvious constitutional problems in addition to the one treated in the text,

including the problem of a case or controversy, right to jury trial, etc.
2 F. FgANEFURTER, SOME REFLEMcrONs ON THE PEADING OF STATUTES 29

(1947).
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tion of the faults of each. The basic difficulty is to secure recognition
of the necessity for merit appointments. How this sense of responsibility is to be secured is a question that has not yet been answered. Nor
is it realistic to expect such improvement at a time when equality
rather than quality is the watchword of government; when mediocrity
rather than talent recommends men for appointment to high posts.
But certainly there is no point in tinkering with the independence
of federal judges by subjecting their tenure to control of other federal
judges appointed by the same defective process. Without their independence, the federal judges will have lost all that separates them from
total subordination to the political processes from which they ought
to be aloof.
In the event that my bias is not yet clear, I would say that I am in
wholehearted agreement with Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Chandler
v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States,3 where
he dealt with the problem that neither the Court nor the Congress
has been prepared to face squarely:
One of the great advances made in the structure of government by our Constitution was its provision for an independent judiciary-for judges who could do their duty as
they saw it without having to account to superior court
judges or to anyone else except the Senate sitting as a court
of impeachment. Article II, § 4, of the Constitution provides
that "Officers of the United States," which includes judges,
"shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and
Misdemeanors," and Art. I, §§ 2 and 3, state that impeachment can be instituted only on recommendation of the
House of Representatives and that trial can be held only
by the Senate. To hold that judges can do what this Judicial
Council has tried to do to Judge Chandler here would in my
judgment violate the plan of our Constitution to preserve,
as far as possible, the liberty of the people by guaranteeing
that they have judges wholly independent of the Government
or any of its agents with the exception of the United States
Congress acting under its limited power of impeachment.
We should stop in its infancy, before it has any growth at all,
this idea that United States district judges can be made accountable for their efficiency or lack of it to judges just over
them in the federal system....
Nor am I impressed by the recent vogue among the States to provide
8 382 U.S. 1003, 1005 (1966). The case, after a mysterious disappearance, has now reappeared on the Court's docket for the 1969 Term.
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means for chastising judges who get out of line. Admittedly, the
worse the quality the more external restraint that is required, provided that the rein is in proper hands. But the various devices that
the States have recently adopted for policing their judiciaries are
little more than polite blackmail, suggestions that the bar is unhappy
with the judge's behavior and he'd better shape up or else. I shudder
to think how early the federal courts might have been deprived of
the services of Judge Learned Hand under such a system as California's. For politeness to counsel and a willingness to tolerate fools
gladly were not among his virtues, and it is only such virtues and that
of regular attendance at the court house that the policing systems
seem capable of evoking from timid judges.
On the question of judicial removal, much has been written. There
is more literature than learning. If the issue is deemed to be resoluble
by the intention of the Founding Fathers, I think that it has been
made pellucidly clear by Martha Ziskind that the intention was to
make impeachment the sole means of removal of federal judicial officers 4 I do not, therefore, propose to reexamine the problem of
original intention here. I propose, here, to look at post-adoption history to see how the three branches of the national government have
dealt with the problem in the past. I have not exhausted these materials but only sampled them. But, as with most social scientists, my
sample is adequate to reveal support for my hypothesis, that legislation
providing alternative means of removal is not the appropriate response to such problems of judicial tenure as may exist.
I. JUDICiAL ATrITUDE

The absence of a definitive answer from the Court on the question
whether a federal judge of a constitutional court might be removed
by some process other than impeachment is due to the failure to
present the issue for judicial resolution. It could come to the Court
only after the executive, the legislature, or the judiciary attempted
to effect such removal. With two exceptions, none of these branches
of the government has seen fit to force the question. The first exception relates to the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, which destroyed
several judgeships created by the previous administration. 5 The
repealing statute was never the subject of challenge in the courts. The
second exception might be found in the case of removal-de facto if
not de jure-of District Judge Chandler by the Tenth Judicial Cir4 Ziskind, judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American
Precedents. This article will appear in 1969 Sup. CT. REv. -.
5 See text at notes 12-26 infra.

1969]

Tenure of Federal Judges

cuit.6 Aside from the .Black opinion quoted above, the Court said
nothing about the issues raised by this action.
As is often the case, however, on many occasions when the issue was
not the subject of Supreme Court resolution, it was the subject of
Supreme Court dictum. These dicta are consistent in their construction of the Constitution as requiring life tenure not subject to abbreviation except by the terms of the Constitution. Starting with
Marshall's proposition in American Insurance Co. v. Canter,7 through
the extensive discussion in a multitude of opinions in Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok,8 the line has been consistent with the authority cited by Mr.
Justice Douglas in the latter case: Alexander Hamilton. The quotation from Hamilton included the following:"
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in
the article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be
impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives,
and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed
from office, and disqualified for holding any other. This is
the only provision on the point which is consistent with the
necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the
only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect
to our own judges.
Indeed, as Glidden makes clear, whichever of the opinions is read,
the essential hallmark of a constitutional court is life tenure guaranteed by the Constitution.
It should be pointed out, however, that just as several members of
the judiciary have in the past recommended a retirement age for
federal judges, so too have some commended the notion of a removal
process short of impeachment. In each case, however, the judicial
commentator made it clear that his recommendation did not include
an opinion that such removal process would satisfy the demands of
the Constitution. Mr. Justice Jackson appeared before a Senate Committee in 1941, shortly after his appointment to the Court, to endorse
the need for a more sophisticated and less cumbersome process for
removal than by impeachment. He was careful to preface his position
6 See note 3 supra.
7 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
8 370 U.S. 530 (1962). Additional cases in this line include: Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S.
438, 449 (1928); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 266 (1900); United States v. Guthrie, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 284, 309 (1854) (dissenting opinion); see also argument by Attorney
General Cushing in that case, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 285-6; Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 225, 258-9 (1839).
9 THE F.DERAusr No. 79, at 491-3 (H. Lodge ed. 1908) (A. Hamilton), quoted in 370
U.S. at 595.
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thus: "There are two aspects of the matter that I do not want to
discuss. One is the issue of constitutionality, as to which I take the
position that the judicial conference under Chief Justice Hughes and
under Chief Justice Stone has taken in discussing the policy of the
matter without expressing any opinion on constitutionality." 10
The position of the Judicial Conference, which Jackson referred
to, was also one of support for the plan, if it were constitutional. 1
The fate of the legislation which evoked these statements from judicial
officers was defeat in Congress, with extensive arguments made as to
the unconstitutional nature of the legislation, the question on which
the judges had abstained.
II.

CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS

The problem of judicial tenure and removal has been the subject
of congressional concern far more often than it has been the object
of judicial scrutiny. Appropriate analysis of the constitutional conventions as understood by Congress would require an exhaustion of the
debates and bills and committee reports. (As I already indicated, except for the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, there has been no
legislation directly on the subject.) I have attempted here to extract
a few samples chosen on a very unscientific basis. I have looked only
to a few of the critical periods when judicial-legislative conflict was
most aggravated. A study of calmer times may reveal more considered
understanding. But it is in times of stress that constitutional conditions are likely to be reshaped to meet new needs.
A. Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801
To begin at the beginning requires a look at the famous debates
over the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801.12 Certainly this was one
of the most hotly contested political controversies that wracked the
young Republic. The background of the 1801 statute makes the con13
troversy more easily understood:
10 Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate on HR. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1941).
11 The attitude of the Judicial Conference was reported this way:
A committee consisting of Judges Biggs, Phillips, and Learned Hand considered
the advisibility of legislation with respect to an alternative for impeachment
proceedings in the case of circuit and district judges charged with derelictions.
On the report of the committee the Conference adopted the following resolution: "Assuming its constitutionality, as to which we express no opinion, we are
in accord with the general purpose and approve in principle the provisions embodied in H.R. 9160, Seventy-sixth Congress, third session."
1940 ATI'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 32.
12 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801).
13 F. FRNKFURTER & J. LANDis, Busxnrss OF =Ha SUPREME COURT 20-21, 25-25 (1927)
(footnotes in original omitted).
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In fact, the Justices carried out the hopes that were entertained for them as inculcators of national patriotism. They
utilized charges to the grand juries as opportunities for popular education. 14 Jay, Cushing, Wilson, Iredell, all indulged
in the practice. These "elegant" and "eloquent" speeches
received wide publicity. Having a Federalist flavor with more
or less pungency, they promptly aroused political opposition.
That the Circuit Justices helped to further the Federalist
cause there can hardly be doubt. That they helped to consolidate the opposition is no less clear. Criticism against the
Judiciary was accumulating from friends, as well as enemies,
of a strong federal bench. Ardent Federalists with increasing
vigor urged Randolph's proposal for separate circuit judges;
the emerging Jeffersonian Party came to regard the federal
courts as a political adjunct of the hated Federalists. The
judicial system was drawn into the vortex of politics.
Dissatisfaction with the existing system was also fed by the
desire of influential opinion to extend the scope of federal
jurisdiction. The interference of local prejudices with the
enforcement of federal law stimulated the proponents of a
more comprehensive federal judiciary. But no serious attempt looking towards drastic reform appears until John
Adams, in 1799, brought the matter before Congress. His
recommendation culminated in the notorious Act of February 13, 1801. This measure combined a thoughtful concern
for the federal judiciary with selfish concern for the Federalist party.
With the election of the Jeffersonians, the 1801 Act was doomed.
But the question remained as to the proper means for reducing the
statute that the Federalists had enacted from such partisan motives.
The battle included not only the contest over the Judiciary Act, but
the question of the propriety of judicial review as fostered by
Marbury v. Madison, 5 and the failure of the impeachment proceedings against Mr. Justice Chase.
For our purposes, the interesting parts of the debates were concerned
not with the power of judicial review which was also subject to attack,
but with the propriety of abolishing the newly created judgeships,
thus ending the tenure of the newly appointed judges. When the
First Judiciary Act was being considered, Mr. Smith of South Carolina
had admonished care in its preparation. For, he said, "The judges are
14 See Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. Cr. Rnv.

127.
15 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
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to hold their commissions during good behaviour, and after they are
appointed, they are only removable by impeachment; consequently
this system must be a permanent one."' 16 He obviously underestimated
the imaginative capacities of his successors.
Senator Breckenridge of Kentucky had sought the advice of John
Taylor of Caroline in order to mount an attack on the Judiciary Act
of 1801. The statute had, among other things, abolished two district
courts in Kentucky and Tennessee, although retaining the judges in
office by assigning them to the newly created circuit courts. Taylor's
advice was found among the Breckenridge, manuscripts and provided
the basis for the action taken by Congress in abolishing the 1801
judgeships: 17
Congress are empowered from time to time to ordain and
establish inferior courts.
The law for establishing the present inferior courts is a
legislative instruction affirming that, under this clause, Congress may abolish as well as create these judicial offices, because it does expressly abolish the then existing courts for
the purpose of making way for the present.
It is probable that this construction is correct, but it is

equally pertinent to our object whether it is or not. If it is,
then the present inferior courts may be abolished as constitutionally as the last; if it is not, then the law for abolishing
the former and establishing the present was unconstitutional,
and being so, is undoubtedly repealable.
Thus the only ground which the present inferior courts
can take is that Congress may from time to time create,
regulate, or abolish such courts as the public interest may
dictate, because such is the very tenure under which they
exist.
' . * The Constitution declares that the judge shall hold
his office during good behavior. Could it mean that he should
hold this office after it was abolished? Could it mean that his
tenure should be limited by behaving well in an office which
did not exist? It must either have intended these absurdities or admit of a construction which will avoid them. This
construction obviously is that an officer should hold that
which he might hold, namely an existing office, so long as
he did that which he might do, namely his duty in that
office; and not that he should hold an office which did not
exist or perform duties not sanctioned by law. If, therefore,
16 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 828 (1789).

17 Breckenridge MSS., Nov. 21, 1801, quoted in Carpenter, Repeal of the Judiciary Act
of 1801, 9 Am. POL. Sci. Rmv. 519, 523-6 (1915).
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Congress can abolish the courts, as they did by the last law,
the officer dies with the office, unless you allow the Constitution to admit impossibilities as well as absurdities.
Nor is it incompatible with the "good behavior" tenure
when its origin is considered. It was invented in England
to counteract the influence of the crown over the judges. And
we have rushed into the principle with such precipitancy,
in imitation of this our general prototype, as to have outstript monarchists in our efforts to establish a judicial oligarchy; their judges being removable by a joint vote of
Lords and Commons, and ours by no similar or easy process.
The tenure, however, is evidently bottomed on the idea
of securing the honesty of judges while exercising the office,
and not upon that of sustaining useless or pernicious offices
for the sake of the judges. The regulation of offices in England, and indeed of inferior offices in most or all countries,
depends upon the legislature; it is a part of the detail of
government which necessarily devolves upon it, and is beyond the foresight of a constitution because it depends upon
variable circumstances. And in England a regulation of the
courts of justice was never supposed to be a violation of the
good behavior tenure. If this principle should disable Congress from erecting tribunals which temporary circumstances
might require, without entailing them upon the society after
these circumstances by ceasing had converted them into
grievances, it would be used in a mode contemplated neither
in its original or duplicate.
Whether courts are erected by a regard to the administration of justice or with the purpose of rewarding a meritorious
faction, the legislature may certainly abolish them without
infringing the Constitution whenever they are not required
by the administration of justice, or the merit of the faction
is exploded and their claim to reward disallowed.
This was the exact line taken by Senator Breckenridge in the Senate
debates, but not without argument.
It is, perhaps, not irrelevant to point out a distinction that was
sought to be drawn between legislation affecting the lower federal
courts and legislation concerning the Supreme Court, the former alleged to be creatures of Congress and the latter to be ordained by
the Constitution. In the words of one of the Republicans, Stevens
8
Thomson Mason:'
18 11 ANNALS OF CoNG. 59 (1801).
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I observe... a dear distinction between the Supreme

Court and the other courts. With regard to the institution
of the Supreme Court the words of the Constitution are
imperative; while with regard to the inferior courts they are
discretionary... [T]he Legislature should have power, from
time to time, to create, to annul, or to modify the courts as
the public good might require, whenever a change of circumstances may suggest the propriety of a different organization.
Senator Stone spoke directly to the issue presented here:' 9
*.. They doubtless shall, (as against the President's power
to retain them in office) in common with other office[r]s of
his appointment, be removed from office by impeachment and
conviction; but it does not follow that they might not be removed by other means. They shall hold their offices during
good behaviour, and they shall be removed from office upon
impeachment and conviction of treason, bribery, and other
high crimes and misdemeanors. If the words, impeachment
of high crimes and misdemeanors, be understood according
to any construction of them hitherto received and established, it will be found, that although a judge, guilty of
high crimes and misdemeanors, is always guilty of misbehaviour in office, yet that of the various species of misbehaviour in office, which may render it exceedingly improper
that a judge shall continue in office, many of them are neither
treason, nor bribery, nor can they be properly dignified by
the appellation of high crimes and misdeameanors; and for
the impeachment of which no precedent can be found; nor
would the words of the Constitution justify such impeachment.
To what source, then, shall we resort for a knowledge of
what constitutes this thing called misbehaviour in office? ...
Their misbehaviour certainly is not an impeachable offence;
still it is the ground upon which judges are to be removed
from office. The process of impeachment, therefore, cannot
be the only one by which the judges may be removed from
office under, and according to the Constitution.

The additional removal power is in the legislature. Only the President is restricted on "removal." The powers given the legislature-to
have the courts meet only every six or ten years, to pack the court, etc.
-show that no significant barrier was intended as against the legislature's control of judges.
19 Id.

at 72.

1969]

Tenure of Federal Judges

Senator Bradley also followed the Taylor line. The words "good
behavior" have been given assorted meanings in assorted states, but
the most appropriate meaning is that used at their source, England.
In England, the putting down of courts and justices is considered consistent with holding office during good behavior.
In the House, Representative Giles, on behalf of repeal, asserted
that the term independence of judges or of the judiciary department
was not to be found in the Constituion but was a mere inference
from some of the specified powers. The Constitution only declared
that there should be such a department formed by the other two departments who owe a responsibility to the people. The only limitation
upon the power of Congress consists in the number of supreme courts
to be established, and the spirit, as well as the words of the Constitution, are completely satisfied provided one Supreme Court be established. He therefore felt the firmest conviction that there was no
constitutional impediment in the way of repealing the act in question.
John Randolph sought a more sophisticated line and one that might
be impossible to draw: 20
I am free to declare that if the intent of this bill is to get
rid of the judges, it is a perversion of your power to a base
purpose; it is an unconstitutional act. If, on the contrary,
it aims not at the displacing one set of men, from whom you
differ in political opinion, with a view to introducing others,
but at the general good by abolishing useless offices, it is a
Constitutional act.
Representative Williams asserted that power to decide what grounds
are constitutionally adequate for impeachment must be in the legislature. Otherwise the judge can rule any attempt to oust him to be
unconstitutional. Courts were created in the interest of the people,
not of the judges, and the representatives of the people must, therefore, have final control. It is enough that judges are free from diminution of salary. The characterization of a life contract is inapt.
The opponents of Breckenridge's propositions were not silent. Senator Tracy attempted to dispose of the distinction between the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts: 21 "No person will say that the judges
of the Supreme Court can be removed, unless by impeachment and
conviction of misbehaviour; but the judges of the inferior courts,
as soon as ordained and established, are placed on precisely the same
grounds of independence with the judges of the Supreme Court."
at 652.
21 Id. at 57.
20 Id.
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Governeur Morris claimed that there was no power of removal
except on impeachment: 22 "Misbehaviour is not a term known in our
law; the idea is expressed by the word misdemeanor; which word is
in the clause respecting impeachments. Taking, therefore, the two
together . -. the Constitution says: 'The judges shall hold their offices
so long as they demean themselves well; but if they shall misdemean,
if they shall on impeachment be convicted of misdemeanor, they
shall be removed.'"
Senator Mason also denied any way of removing a judge from office
or the office from the judge except by way of impeachment.
Senator White proposed that on accepting their appointments
judges entered into a contract with the government that guaranteed
life tenure during good behavior, so that any law diminishing their
tenure would be an unconstitutional impairment of contract and
ex post facto law. Senator Chipman also asserted that continuance
of office during good behavior was solely at the option of the judge.
He relied in part on the proposition that the Constitution, having
provided an exception to life tenure by way of the misbehavior clause,
excluded all other bases for limiting tenure.
Senator Calhoun asserted that once a judge received his commission,
he was "completely beyond the reach of Legislative power .... We all
fully and at once understand what is good behaviour in a judge, the
oath he takes and the very nature of the office show it; to act with
justice, integrity, ability, and honor, and to administer justice speedily
and impartially, is good behaviour; if he acts contrary, it would be
misbehaviour, and the Constitution, in that case, has given a remedy
'23
by impeachment.
Senator Ross rejected the notion that the standard was the same
here as in Great Britain where the Crown on the address of both
houses could limit tenure. He relied on the need for independence
of the judiciary as described by Judge Pendleton of the high court
of Virginia.
The judiciary had its defenders in the House of Representatives
as well. Hemphill argued that the power to interfere with the judiciary
was reserved to the people by the ninth and tenth amendments, in
order to assure the people an independent judiciary. Bayard argued
that if the judges had shown undue partisanship, the proper remedy
was by way of impeachment: "What is meant by tenure of 'good behavior'?" It meant a tenure for life, unless the judge committed a
misdemeanor. This was the understanding in England. The only ex22
23

Id. at 90.
Id. at 139-40.
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press condition was the requirement of good behavior. The provision
for such basis for removal precluded any other bases. The framers
of the Constitution had been offered the opportunity to provide for
removal of judges by other means and had rejected it.
Representative Smith asserted that while the legislature had the
power to remove the jurisdiction of the lower courts it had no authority to limit the tenure of the judges except by impeachment. And
Representative Rutledge turned to The Federalist for support of a
similar conclusion. He quoted from No. 78:24
. . . good behaviour for the continuance in office of the
judicial magistracy, is the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government ....
And it is the
best expedient that can be devised in any Government to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the
laws. ... The complete independence of the courts of justice
is essential in a limited Constitution; one containing specific
exceptions to the legislative authority. . . . Such limitations
can be preserved in practice no other way than through
the courts of justice . . . . The Convention acted wisely in
establishing good behaviour as the tenure of judicial offices.
This plan would have been inexcusably defective had it
wanted this important feature of good government.
He concluded from this that judges were removable only by impeachment. He then quoted from Madison's debates on the first judiciary
bill: "The judges are to be removed only on impeachment, and
conviction before Congress." 2 5 And from Mr. Gerry: 26 "The judges
will be independent, and no power can remove them: they will be
beyond the reach of the other powers of the Government; they will
be unassailable, and cannot be affected but by the united voice of
America, and that only by a change of Government ....
" i.e., by
constitutional amendment or revolution.
A most eloquent defense of judicial independence was made by
Mr. Griswold. It was clear to him that judges could lose their office
only on conviction for misbehavior after impeachment. He found
that the failure to provide for the inclusion of the power of removal
that was existent in England, i.e., on motion of both houses of Parliament and action taken pursuant thereto by the Crown, was deliberate.
Mr. Dana was even more persuasive. He, too, showed that the
24 Id. at 736.
25 Id. at 738.
25 Id.
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proposal for removal by joint motion of both houses was laid before
the convention and rejected. Jefferson's Virginia constitution specifically provided that judges of the higher court should hold tenure
during good behavior but judges of the lower courts should have
tenure during good behavior and the existence of the courts. The
absence of such qualification on the tenure of the lower courts in
the national constitution indicated the lack of intention to incorporate
this difference. Mr. Dana added that the power to remove judges was
not different from the power to remove the President, i.e., only by
impeachment processes as specified in the Constitution.
Despite this eloquent defense of the judiciary, the Jeffersonians prevailed, although by but a single vote in the Senate. The courts created
by the 1801 Act were abolished. No judicial test of this action was
made. Following this success, the Jeffersonians sought to eliminate
the Federalist judges who were holding office under the original
judiciary act by bringing impeachment proceedings. They were successful in the removal of Judge Pickering of New Hampshire, but
this movement foundered when the impeachment of Mr. Justice Chase
failed of conviction.
B. Judicial Reconstruction after the Civil War
In the Reconstruction Congress, there was an interesting forerunner
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan. Of the antipathy of the Radicals to the Court, nothing need be added here. One
of the attacks on the Court in the House of Representatives came
under the leadership of Representative Bingham. He sought to secure
an addition to the Senate Judiciary bill that would "permit" voluntary
retirement of judges on pension, and would provide further: 27
That if any judge who shall have attained the aforesaid age
shall be incompetent, by reason of disease or infirmity, to
make and file such certificate, the facts of his age and incompetency may be proved by satisfactory evidence before any
judge of the Supreme Court; and upon such justice filing his
certificate of such facts with the President the said judge shall
thereupon be excused and retired with like effect as upon
his own certificate.
Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That within six months
after the filing with the President of either of the certificates
mentioned in section five of this act, or if any judge of any
of the courts of the United States whose age now exceeds
seventy years, or who shall hereafter arrive at the age of
27 CONG. GLOBE,

41st Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1869).
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seventy years, shall for one year after the passage of this act,
or after arriving at the age of seventy years, continue to hold
his office without filing such certificate, it shall in either of
such cases be the duty of the President to nominate and appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, an
additional judge for the said court, who shall have the same
power and perform the same duties and receive the same
compensation as the judge then acting in such court, or who
shall be retired and excused from so acting, and shall, in connection with or in the absence of his senior associate, hold
the courts prescribed by law for said senior or retired judge;
and upon the decease of said senior, associate, or retired
judge, or upon his ceasing for any cause to hold said office,
the said additional judge appointed under the provisions of
this act shall be and become the judge of such court.
On the constitutional issue, Bingham asserted: 28
I think I am justified in saying that the committee are
of the opinion that it is not competent for the Congress of
the United States under the Constitution to pass any law
requiring a judge of the United States to resign. ...
Mr. Speaker, there is another provision of the amendment
which may become very important, the provision which provides for retiring incompetent judges and supplying their
places. Suppose a judge upon your Supreme bench is struck
by paralysis. He is unable to tender his resignation or to
take any action in the premises. How can you supply his
place except by some such provision as this, which provides
for evidence being taken and for the appointment of a judge
to take his place as an acting member of the court? It must
occur to members of the House that there is no room for the
impeachment of a United States judge on account of the
visitation of God. His commission runs for life, or during
good behavior; and he cannot be removed by reason of
having been overtaken by disease, and thereby rendered incapable of taking his place upon the bench....
...

When Bingham was challenged on the constitutional question, a
rather unenlightening dialogue followed between Bingham and Lawrence. 2 9 Mr. Jenckes, like Bingham, had little difficulty with the
constitutional issue. And like Bingham, he conceded:80
We cannot, under the Constitution, compel the judges to
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.

at 338.
at 340,
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resign when they are seventy years of age and accept a pension. The law gives them the office for life or during good
behavior. We cannot pass a law excluding them from the
court after a certain age and allowing them to draw their
present salary, or five times their present salary, if you please.
They are created judges by the Constitution, and they hold
their offices by a title greater than that which we can create,
and their salary by a firmer tenure than that which any law
can give....
31
Mr. Kerr, however, saw the problem differently:

But, Mr. Speaker, it is proposed by this bill to retire by
congressional legislation certain judges after they shall have
passed the age of seventy years. The honorable gentleman
from Ohio, [Mr. Bingham,] my colleague on the committee,
will doubtless say that such is not the precise proposition contained in this bill. But I insist that the logical effect, the
legal effect, the practical effect, of this proposition will be
to retire those judges, willing or unwilling. The bill provides
that the Supreme Court shall consist of nine judges; and then
it is declared that whenever a judge shall have attained the
age of seventy years and shall have rendered service for ten
years in any judicial department of the Federal Government
he may retire from active service and receive a pension equal
to his salary....
The court is to consist primarily of nine judges. The gentleman from Ohio undertakes to correct me by saying that it
shall ultimately consist of nine judges, together with the retired judges. The retired judges and the judges who shall be
appointed to take their places are theoretically to perform
precisely the same duties and to have precisely the same
jurisdiction. If one holds a circuit court anywhere in the
country, the other in theory of law is supposed to sit with
him. If the new judge takes his seat upon the bench, the old
judge may do the same. If it is competent for Congress to
do thus by indirection what it cannot do directly, if it is
competent for Congress to enact such a provision as this,
then it is equally competent for Congress to say that after
a judge shall have attained the age of sixty years or fifty years
or forty years, he may in like manner be retired or superseded or may be aided by the appointment of another judge
who shall sit with him, dividing with him his jurisdictiondividing with him every one of the functions of his office
until, if this process be continued, the court, so far as this
31 Id. at 341-2.
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new organization is concerned, will become a mockery of a
judicial tribunal.
The man who is thus superseded by the appointment of
another judge is practically retired from office, and he, if
not we, will so understand it. He and the country will understand when his successor is thus appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate that he himself is notified that
his services are no longer needed on the bench ....
It seems to me that this provision will introduce into our
judicial system and into the control of Congress over it a
most dangerous principle of interference, one that will go to
the very fundamental idea upon which that court was organized, upon which its great service as a coordinate department of the Government must always rest. It will go directly,
most logically and most dangerously, to disturb the independence of that department of the Government, and to
place it, as well as all others, under the power of the legislative department, and I submit that it was that very fear, an
apprehension of that very danger, a prescience of what is
this day being done, that led the framers of our Constitution
to incorporate the provision organizing that court precisely
as it is. In this opinion I am not unsustained by the history
of this provision in our Constitution. During its consideration in the Convention there was a proposition made concerning which I will read from the Commentaries of Justice
Story, section sixteen hundred and nineteen:
"A proposition of a more imposing nature was to authorize
a removal of the judges for inability to discharge the duties
of their office. But all considerate persons will readily perceive that such a provision would either not be practiced
upon or would be more liable to abuse than calculated to
answer any good purpose. The mensuration of the faculties
of the mind has no place in the catalogue of any known art
or science. An attempt to fix the boundary between the region of ability and inability would much oftener give rise
to personal or party attachments and hostilities than advance the interest of justice or the public welfare, and instances of absolute imbecility would be too rare to justify
the introduction of so dangerous a provision." . . .
For the very highest of reasons the constitutional Convention refused to confer upon the legislative department of
the Government any right at all under any circumstances to
sit in judgment upon the ability or inability of the judges
of the Supreme Court. It is not permitted to Congress at all
to say what shall be the exact measure of ability for a judge
of that court, or what shall constitute disability for the dis-
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charge of its duties, or what age in life or service shall limit
the judicial capacity. If it were, with what dangers would we
be instantly surroundedl If Congress could declare that at
the age of seventy years a man was incompetent to perform
judicial service in that court, could not Congress, its own
discretion being its supreme law, declare that a man at the
age of sixty should be held thereafter to be incompetent for
the discharge of such duties, or that at forty, or even at thirtyfive, he should be held to be incompetent? Whenever you
leave the power at all to the legislative department you make
the discretion of that body its rule of action, unless you
prescribe qualifications and limitations upon that power,
which it would be very difficult indeed to do....
The issue was fought, not in Kerr's realistic terms, but on the issue
whether Congress could provide annuities for superannuated judges.
Thus, Mr. Butler spoke to the constitutional issues on the assumption
32
that all that was involved was voluntary retirement:
What is the exact thing we propose? That these men shall
remain as judges because we cannot under the Constitution
prevent that, but that they may be retired from active duty
if they choose. Is there anything against the Constitution in
that? My friend says we are doing that indirectly which we
cannot do directly. No, sir; let me correct his phrase, with
due consideration. We are allowing them to do that for themselves which we cannot do to them ....
Is there anything
in the Constitution which prevents that? Does it militate
against the dicta of Hamilton upon this question? Hamilton
feared-and it was the fear of men of his cast of thought
in that day-lest there should be an attempt to remove judges
by the Legislature and to overrule the judiciary, for he
looked upon, and all the men of that day who thought with
him looked upon the judiciary as the great arbiter between
the other branches of the Government, the great protector
of the rights of the people; and it was thought necessary,
even at the risk of all the inconvenience that I have been
speaking of, to make the judges independent of every power
beyond the very power of removal. In that they but followed
the great reform which had not very long before that taken
place in England, by which the judges were made independent of the will of the king and held their offices during
good behavior.
But, mark the difference of circumstances. We were then
but just starting as a nation. John Marshall and the justices
32

Id. at app. 2.
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of that day were young men. Our fathers saw no evil or
trouble arising from old age or incompetency of the judges.
They were dealing with a small people. Sir, I agree it is necessary to have an independent judiciary, but it is equally
necessary to have an effective judiciary. . . And I think
there is no man in the country who will not say that it is
the best way for us to allow the men who from age and infirmity cannot carry on judicial work to remove themselves,
and to give them this poor privilege of retiring from active
service on the bench with a support for their declining
years ....
Although the Bingham amendments passed the House, the bill
that was ultimately approved provided only for voluntary retirement
and omitted the court-packing provisions. Reading these debates, one
wonders why it took so long for Franklin Roosevelt to come up with
his version of court-packing. 33 Certainly Bingham had anticipated
the Roosevelt plan.
C. The Abolition of the Commerce Court
The next set of congressional debates to which I refer centered,
as did the 1802 contest, on the power of Congress to abolish judicial
posts along with the abolition of a federal court, this time the Commerce Court of the United States. Once again political feelings ran
high over the issue. The court was established in 1910, after bitter
debate, to centralize review of the Interstate Commerce Commission
in a single court. That the court was intended to serve and did serve
as a tight rein on the Commission is clear from its antecedents and its
judgments. By 1911, the court was already on its death bed.
In the background of the debates over the Commerce Court was
the populist demand for a power of recall over the members of the
judiciary and its opinions, led by former President Theodore Roosevelt and desperately fought by President Taft. The temper of the
times may be derived from a series of Senate Documents, all of which
are concerned, in whole or part, with the need to control the judiciary.34 The presence of this conflict is reflected throughout the debates.
35
Senator Bailey's remarks are not untypical:
But, Mr. President, if there were no other reasons I could
not vote for this proposition, because it is a sort of legislative
33 See Leuchtenburg, The Origin of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-packing" Plan,
1966 Sup. CT. REv. 347.
84 See, e.g., S. Doc. Nos. 292, 302, 348, 406, 408, 451, 452, 472, 473, 892, 941, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1912); S.Doc. Nos. 1075, 1106, 1108, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
35 48 CONG. REc. 7843 (1912).
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recall of this court. That is precisely what it is, and that is
precisely what it is intended to be. Some Senators, and others
who have not taken the trouble to examine these decisions,
are not satisfied with them, and they proceed to recall the
court. If, when the court does not please the Senate, we can
repeal the law which created it, we shall have precious little
right to complain of those gospelers of riot and disorder who
now are proposing not only to recall the courts, but to overrule the decisions of courts by plebiscite. We shall make the
proposition of an ex-President eminently respectable and
conservative if we go to the extent of repealing the law
which created this court, because, forsooth, we do not happen
to like some of its decisions.
Senator Bailey also had some interesting remarks to make about the
36
scope of "good behavior":
I do not agree that a judge holds his office for life. He
holds it merely during his good behavior. I have never believed that in order to remove a judge it is necessary to prove
against him the same things it would be necessary to prove
against an officer holding for a fixed term, who can not be
impeached except for high crimes or misdemeanors.
What language of the Constitution he was relying on for this distinction is not revealed.
The House. bill did not propose to abolish the judgeships along
with the court. The judges of the Commerce Court had been appointed as "additional circuit judges" to sit for a period of five years
on the Commerce Court but to serve by assignment on the circuit
courts. At the end of five years different judges from other federal
courts were to be assigned to replace these judges on the Commerce
Court while these judges continued their duties on the circuit courts.
It was Senator Overman who proposed the elimination of the
judgeships as well as the court.37 Thus was revived the debate of
1802, with little more contribution made to the arguments of that
time, but with a few sidelights thrown on the issues more immediately
relevant to the Tydings Committee's inquiries.
There is a lengthy exegesis on the question by Senator (later Mr.
Justice) Sutherland. The Senate was sharply divided on the question
whether existing judicial offices could be abolished thus ending the
tenure of the incumbents. The 1802 precedent being thrown in his
face, Sutherland quoted extensively from Story and St. George Tucker
36 Id. at 7844.
37 Id. at 7969.
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and their opinions that the 1802 action by Congress was unconstitutional.38 Backed to the wall by the argument that Congress had power
to remove all the jurisdiction of all federal courts, except for the
original jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by the Constitution, Sutherland at one point agreed that the judges would have
to be kept "in office" although they had no functions to perform, but
ultimately fell back to Story's position that all of the jurisdiction
provided in article III had to be conferred on some federal court. 39
Senator Cummins, himself no mean constitutional lawyer, returned
to the question of the meaning of "good behavior" and secured
Sutherland's agreement in a proposal of more interest to the issues
now under consideration. But he aroused the opposition of Senator
40
Lodge:
It would be most interesting and instructive if we were
to enter for a little while, and I do intend to do it, upon
the consideration of the term "good behavior"; there is a
prevalent notion throughout the country that judges of the
Federal courts are appointed for life. That is not true. They
are appointed during good behavior. I recognize that I am
not now speaking directly to the point at issue, but we so
often hear the expression that Federal judges are appointed
for life that I want to give some publicity to the real language of the Constitution, which is "during good behavior."
I am not one of the persons who believes that the determination of what is good behavior can be had only in an impeachment trial. My friend from Utah says that unless a Federal
judge is removed from his office by the process of impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors he must remain
there during his natural life. I can not agree to that statement. I do not intend to pause to even discuss what procedure could be established by Congress in order to determine
what good behavior is and what it is not; but I believe that
there is misbehavior on the part of a judge for which he can
be removed from office that does not arise to the dignity
or the severity of either a crime or a misdemeanor. ...
Mr. Sutherland. Either I did not express myself as I intended to do so or the Senator from Iowa did not quite understand me. I did not mean to say that a judge could hold his
office until he had been impeached.... I am not at all certain
but that there may be such behavior upon the part of a judge
38 Id. at 7995-6.
39 Id. at 7998.
40 Id. at 7999-8000.
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short of an impeachable offense that would enable us to get
rid of him. I did not mean to antagonize that position.
Mr. Cummins. I am very glad indeed that I misunderstood
the Senator from Utah, because in these days when clouds are
rolling around the judiciary, when various remedies are proposed for their recall, I think it is well to remember that we
have somewhere, somehow, the power to determine the good
behavior of the judges of the United States, and that therefore
we do not need, at this time at any rate, those severer changes
that are suggested in the recall by a popular vote.
I think that Congress has the power to provide for the
removal of judges of the United States whenever they violate
the rule which is established in the Constitution, namely, the
rule of good behavior; and that means that these judges must
obey, and as I am very glad to say that they generally have
obeyed, the fundamental principles of propriety and of ethics.
The Senate voted to abolish the offices along with the court, but in
conference, the House prevailed and the judgeships were retained. 4'
But this wasn't enough to save the bill from presidential veto, with
language by President Taft reminiscent of the manner in which Sen42
ator Bailey started the debate in the Senate:
*.. I am utterly opposed to the abolition of a
its decisions may not always meet the approval
in the Legislature. It is introducing a recall of
which, in its way, is quite as objectionable as
popular method proposed....

court because
of a majority
the judiciary,
the ordinary

Congress could not override the veto.4 3 But this was not the end of
the matter.
During the third session of the 62nd Congress, the Senate found
Judge Archibald of the Commerce Court guilty of the impeachment
charges brought against him.44 For our purposes the most interesting
materials consisted of a separate opinion by Senators Elihu Root and
Henry Cabot Lodge indicating a diametrically opposed view of the
concept of "good behavior" to that agreed upon by Senators Cummins
and Sutherland above:4 5
OPINIONS OF SENATOR ROOT AND SENATOR LODGE

In the impeachment of Robert W. Archibald, January 13,
1918: I have voted that the respondent is guilty under articles
41 Id. at 8001; 10057.
42 Id. at 11027.

at 11034-5.
44 49 CONG. REc. 1448 (1913).
43 Id.
45 Id.
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1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 13, because I find that he used the power and
influence of his office as judge of the Court of Commerce to
secure favors of money value for himself and his friends from
railroad companies, some of which were litigants in his court
and all of which were under the regulation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, subject to the review of the Court
of Commerce.
I consider this course of conduct, and each instance of it,
to be a high crime and misdemeanor.
I have voted "not guilty" upon the other articles, because
while most of them involve improper conduct, I do not consider that the acts proved are high crimes and misdemeanors....

Elihu Root.
I concur in the foregoing, except as to article 4, upon which
I voted the respondent guilty.
H. C. Lodge.
By the next session of Congress, Wilson had succeeded to the Presidency. The Commerce Court was doomed. But the question remained
whether the judges were to be deprived of their tenure. This time the
House demanded the elimination of the judges, 40 but the Senate proved
recalcitrant. The debate on the issue took place on the Senate floor.
It was essentially a reprise of the arguments already examined and concerned only the issue of the power of the legislature to abolish judicial
posts and thereby terminate the tenure of the holders thereof. Senators
Borah and Walsh carried the burden of demonstrating constitutional
doubts about the proposed abolition of the judgeships and Senators
Bacon and Smith of Georgia were the advocates in defense of the proposition. 47 The Senate version, preserving the judgeships, ultimately
prevailed, so that the precedent of 1802 was not repeated.
D. Hatton Sumners' Judicial Good Behavior Bill
The last of my expeditions into extensive congressional debates is
concerned with the proposal to provide an alternative system to that
of impeachment for removal of judges. These proceedings in the 75th
and 76th Congresses were not unrelated to the general problem that
gave rise to the Roosevelt court-packing plan. Again, then, we have a
situation in which strong political feelings against the judiciary are
not irrelevant to the debate.
House Resolution No. 227 to bring this issue before the Commit46 50 CONG. REc. 4543 (1918).
47 Id. at 5409-18; 5426-9.
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tee of the whole House was called up by Representative Smith in the
8
first session of the 75th Congress:
Mr. Smith. ...

As you know, our customary way for the

trial of Federal judges is through impeachment. I think we
have all, over a period of years, come to feel that the only way
to get rid of a Federal judge is through impeachment. Under
the Sumners bill a method is provided which will relieve the
Senate of the burden of the trial of impeachment cases of the
inferior judges of the Federal courts. The bill only applies
to district judges of Federal courts. [Later versions expanded
the applicability to other Federal courts but not the Supreme
Court.]
First, I will call your attention to the constitutional provision, which provides that Federal judges shall hold office not
for life but during good behavior. We have rather come to
assume that they hold office for life. They do not. They hold
office, under the Constitution, only during good behavior.
The purpose of this bill is to set up a court to judicially try
the question of the good behavior of a Federal judge against
whom impeachment charges have been preferred. Under the
procedure set up in this bill we would proceed just exactly as
we do today up to the point where an impeachment is voted
by the House of Representatives. In other words, impeachment charges would be filed against a district judge. They
would go to the Committee on the Judiciary, and that committee would consider the matter thoroughly and investigate
it, and it would come into the House and be debated, and we
would vote upon an impeachment resolution just as we have
always done. After the House has voted the impeachment resolution, then under this bill the procedure changes. Under this
bill a court is set up, consisting of three judges of the circuit
courts of appeals, to be selected by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Those judges would then proceed to try the
question of the good behavior of the judge whose good behavior has been questioned, and if upon trial of that case they
determine that his behavior was other than good behavior,
he would then be removed from office; but no other penalty
would attach.
There will be an amendment offered by the committee
which will provide in case of those trials that after trial by
the court in the first instance either side shall have the right
of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. ...
Whenever there is an impeachment trial it is necessary to consume the time of the entire Senate of the United States some48 81 CONG.

REc. 6157-8 (1937).
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times for a period of weeks on the trial of a question of
whether a minor Federal judge shall continue to hold his
office. ... Necessarily, with the manifold duties of Members
of the Senate, that is an unsatisfactory trial....
This bill will protect the judges in every way, because it
will give them as fair and impartial a tribunal as they now
have, but one which will give its undivided attention to the
trial of the issue. There will be no danger that a judge may
be hauled up and tried for some trivial charge, because, first,
it has to come under the present procedure, and there has to
be an impeachment resolution offered on the floor. It must
be considered by the Committee on the Judiciary and voted
out, and then it must come back to the floor of this House
and be debated before an impeachment resolution is voted.
Only after that impeachment is voted can his conduct be
tried....
Representative Sabath also spoke for the bill,4 9 but its chief proponent was its sponsor, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
Representative Sumners, who undertook to explain and defend it at
length: 50
This bill does not at all rest upon the provision of the Constitution dealing with impeachment. The thing which we are
attempting to do here has absolutely no relationship to the
impeachment power. The last part of article II deals with
impeachment. ...
' [It] is the good behavior clause which this bill seeks to
have recognized; that is, "good behavior" as a justiciable issue.
When we read that provision we find that judges are not appointed for life, but are appointed during good behavior. It
is a condition attached to their right to hold office. When they
violate that condition they not only bring disgrace upon the
giver of their commission but they forfeit their right to hold
office. If we get that in our mind, we then have the second
proposition.
If the Senate cannot make vital the "good behavior" provision in the judicial tenure clause, and clearly it cannot
do it, what agency of government can do it? The historical
background precludes any notion that the President can
effectuate those words, because those words went into the
framework of the English constitution, from which we appropriated them, in order to prevent the Executive from having
Id. at 6161-2.
50 Id. at 6163-6.
49
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anything to do with it. So, by the process of elimination we
come to a court as the only agency of government that can
keep those words from being dead words in the Constitution.
I think everybody must agree with that....
Mr. Mott. I do not agree and I want to tell the gentleman my interpretation just in a word and ask him what is
the matter with it. It has always been my opinion that the
reason why "good behavior" was inserted in that clause of
the Constitution was so that judges appointed for life could
be impeached. In other words, if this provided that judges
should hold their terms for life, then the language would be
repugnant to section 4 of article II, and it is doubtful if you
could impeach, and I think it is for that reason that section
1 specified the term during good behavior instead of life.
What is wrong with that?
Mr. Sumners of Texas. I say with all respect that is the expression of an immature judgment which is found in ninetenths of American lawyers. I went through the same process
or rather from the same starting point. We all start with the
notion that we can only remove a judge by impeachment.
This is what is wrong with it. All civil officers are subject to
removal by impeachment. The length of the terms of office
has nothing to do with it. Whether for 4 years, during good
behavior, or for life, it is all the same. If they commit "high
crimes and misdemeanors" and so forth they bring themselves
within the powers of the Senate to remove by impeachment.
"Good behavior" by its nature is a justiciable issue. By its
use it is made a condition in the right of every judge to hold
office. It is a triable issue. There is no court to try it. This bill
provides the court. If there is no court there is no agency to
make effective that important condition in this particular
section of the Constitution....
Unquestionably it is a fact as everybody will agree that we
took the provision of our Constitution under consideration
from the English Constitution. Everybody knows that. I have
in my hand a recognized authority as a commentator on the
English Constitution, Todd. He says that "good behavior" in
the English Constitution has always been recognized as a
justiciable issue, triable in their courts by scire facias, a proceeding similar to our quo warranto....
It was recognized in England, when we brought this provision into our Constitution, that there were four methods
of getting rid of judges: By impeachment; by joint address of
the two Houses; by conviction for an offense; and by writ of
scire facias, which is exactly the process that we expect to
institute under this provision. . ..
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It is a queer thing that the notion is so deeply rooted that
because we may remove a judge by impeachment we may not
remove him by court action in a suit brought to enforce a
clear condition attached to his right to hold office....
A constitutional challenge came from Mr. Gwynne.5 1 But the main
52
spokesman for the opposition was Mr. Celler:
Mr. Chairman, from my review of the cases, the Constitution
itself, the authorities, and the debates in the original Constitutional Convention, I am firmly of the conviction that we have
no authority whatsoever to pass this bill. I sympathize fully
with the objectives sought; I believe that the trial of an accused judge by impeachment is highly unsatisfactory; nevertheless, despite my sympathy with the objectives of the bill,
I do not believe that it can be accomplished legally or constitutionally. There is no short cut. If we want to change the
method of trial of judges accused, we must follow the Constitution. To do it in the way that our distinguished chairman
wishes to do it would require, beyond peradventure of doubt,
a constitutional amendment.
We often grow impatient with our judiciary, and especially
so when they decide against us or when they in their decisions
or opinions develop economic or political views differently
than we would, or when we do not agree with the results
generally, even though it does not affect us materially; but
when sensible men viewing in retrospect what our district
courts, our circuit courts, and our Supreme Court have done
they will have naught but praise for our courts....
I want to maintain as much independence for our judiciary as is possible, and the only way that we can maintain an
independent judiciary is to make attack upon them difficult,
not too easy; otherwise the judges will no longer be independent, but will truckle to this influence and that influence, to
this personage and that personage, and we would, therefore,
strike a decided blow at the judiciary and destroy their independende. [Applause.] Now, insofar as you make these attacks
upon the judiciary easier I am against it. ...
I may say with all due deference to the author of the bill
that the best argument against its validity is its novelty. I said
this in the minority report and I am going to repeat it:
It scarcely can be believed that the framers intended
vesting Congress with an important power and then
51 Id. at 6169-70.
52 Id. at 6170-3; 6187.
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so skillfully concealed it[,] it could not be discovered
save after 150 years.
* I have before me the Federalist, volume 2, numbers
65 and 66, with contributions by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay.
It covers the matter of impeachment. There is a clear indication that the framers of the Constitution wished to limit beyond any question the right to impeach and try judges, to
limit the right of removal, to the Congress of the United
States. Particularly we are told that efforts were made to set
up a different tribunal. An effort was made to set up the Supreme Court as a tribunal to try these recreant judges. We are
told by these savants that the framers in the Constitutional
Convention rejected every solitary one of the proposals other
than the one we find in the Constitution.
Now, that is the best argument in the world. They rejected
every single proposal, except that the House shall impeach
and the Senate shall try the cause. The House shall be the
sole entity to bring impeachment charges. We are told in
article I, section 2:
And the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment.
We are told in article I, section 3:
The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.
The use of the word "sole" in those two particulars undoubtedly is most significant, particularly in the light of the history
of the Constitutional Convention, which we are told rejected
all alternatives except the one we have followed for 150 years.
Therefore, I cannot lay too great emphasis on the use of the
word "sole" in two instances. To my mind the conclusion is
inescapable that the only way you can try these judges is by the
method that the Constitution allows us to use, and I do not
care what you call the trial, whether impeachment, ouster,
removal, or by any other name ...
The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Hobbs], my very dear
friend who sits next to me, has issued a challenge to me, and
has asked me to show by reference to the Constitution or by
reference to the debates in the Constitutional Convention, that
there was any argument on any basis for this additional
method of removal. I refer the gentleman to the debate in the
Constitutional Convention held as of Monday, August 27,
1787, which dearly indicates, to my mind, that the framers
of the Constitution intended only one method of ouster of
judges, namely, impeachment....
Reed of Illinois and Tolan of California, Hobbs of Alabama, and
Robinson of Kentucky all spoke at length in favor of the constitution-
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ality of the bill. 53 Hancock of New York, Michener of Michigan, and
Sauthoss of Wisconsin were all vigorous opponents.54
The bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 221 to 125.
(In the majority were Congressmen Lyndon B. Johnson and Fred M.
Vinson; among the dissenters was Congressman Everett M. Dirksen.)
It was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee 55 and appears to have
died there.
The issue was revived in the first session of the 76th Congress by
Congressman Sumners. This time courts of appeals judges were also
placed under the Damoclean sword.5 6 But not until the third session
did debate again occur. This time Hobbs led off the fight with an extensive constitutional defense of the proposal. 57 Sumners again waxed
long and eloquent on behalf of his bill. 58 Mr. Michener organized the
attack on constitutional grounds and was supported by Lewis of Ohio
and Rees of Kansas. 59 Mr. Guyer of Kansas, Mr. Hancock of New York,
and others argued at length in defense of this bill. 60 The battle was
long, but the bill was defeated, 236 Nays to 104 Yeas.
The war, however, was not quite over. A similar bill was introduced
in the 77th Congress by Sumners and this time he squeezed it past the
House by a vote of 124 to 122.61 Nothing more came of this bill or of
similar bills offered by Sumners in the House in the 78th and 79th
Congresses. But the Senate Judiciary Committee did hold hearings
on the Sumners bill for the 77th Congress and evoked testimony from
Mr. Justice Jackson in favor of the principle of the bill and the need
therefor if not in favor of its constitutionality. 62 This ended, temporarily at least, the movement for judicial removal by means other than
impeachment.
III. EXECUTIvE OPINIONS
The views of the executive branch of the Government on this subject are more elusive. But the isolated examples that I have uncovered
53 Id. at 6173-5; 6176-9; 6181-4.
54 Id. at 6166-7; 6179-81; 6181.

55 Id. at 6207.
56 See 84 CONG. Rrc. 25, 4638, 5096 (1939); H.R. RE. No. 537, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1939).
57 86 CONG. Rac. 4197-4200 (1940).
58 Id. at 4202-6.
59 Id. at 4200-1; 4201; 4202.
60 Id. at 4206-12.
61 87 CONG. Rrc. 8168 (1941).,
62 See note 10 supra. For further, if repetitive, exegesis on the constitutional question,
see H.R. REP. No. 814, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. REP. No. 537, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939).
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indicate an understanding little different from the views of the other
branches.
Thus, Thomas Jefferson, prior to his Presidency, thought that appointments with life tenure was the appropriate term for judicial
office: "The judges .. . should not be dependent upon any man or
body of men. To these ends they should hold their estates for life
in their offices, or in other words, their commissions should be during
good behavior." 68 That he had lost the taste for this protection of the
independence of the judiciary by the time of his Presidency is common
knowledge. It was he who sponsored the successful attack on the 1801
Judiciary Act. It was he who sponsored the impeachment attacks on
the federal judiciary. It was he, when he found that impeachment
was not a successful method for removal of Federalists from the bench,
who resorted to proposed constitutional change of the life tenure and
good behavior provisions.
Dean Leonard Levy describes Jefferson's reactions to his political
64
frustrations:
Since impeachment was a "farce," he wrote, an amendment
was needed to rebuke the judiciary for extending "immunity
to that class of offenders which endeavors to overturn the
Constitution, and are themselves protected in it by the Constitution... If their protection of Burr produces this amend-

ment, it will do more good than his condemnation would
have done."
'..*After Burr's acquittal Jefferson declared once again that

the result was "equivalent to a proclamation of impunity to
every traitorous combination which may be formed to destroy
the Union," but an amendment to the Constitution would
make the judiciary dependent on the "nation."
. .. The amendment recommended by Jefferson throughout

1807 had originally been proposed by John Randolph, first in
1805 and again in 1806. It made federal judges removable by
the President on the joint address of both houses of Congress.
A few days after Jefferson's ,Seventh Annual Address, Senator
Edward Tiffin of Ohio offered the same amendments, with the
additional provision that the judges' tenure be limited to a
specified number of years. The proposed amendment however
was not reported out of committee. Jefferson's goal of checking
the judiciary failed. His advocacy in 1789 of an independent
judiciary as a means of enforcing civil liberties against the
government better comports with the image of him as the
apostle of freedom....
63 Quoted in E. HAYNES, SEEMoN AND TENuRE OF JuDGEs
64 L. Lvy, JEFFERSON AND CIV LiBERTIES 79-81 (1963).

93 (1944).
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Jeffersonian position is
that he did think it necessary to resort to constitutional, not merely
legislative, changes to effect his objectives.
In 1868, President Johnson, who showed more prescience than he
has been given credit for, proposed several amendments to the Constitution, again including one that would limit the tenure of the
judicial office: 65
It is strongly impressed on my mind that the tenure of office
by the judiciary of the United States during good behavior
for life is incompatible with the spirit of republican government, and in this opinion I am surely sustained by the evidence of popular judgment upon this subject in the different States of the Union.
I therefore deem it my duty to recommend an amendment to the Constitution by which the terms of the judicial
officers would be limited to a period of years, and I herewith present it in the hope that Congress will submit it to
the people for their decision ....
His other proposals for constitutional amendment included direct
election of the President and Vice-President, provision for succession
to the office of the President, and direct election of Senators. Two of
his recommendations for constitutional change have been effected,
one-relating to the electoral college-may be on its way to effectuation, and the fourth is again the subject of serious consideration by
Congress.
At the time of the Commerce Court debates referred to at length
above, the courts of the country were subject to severe attack, with
ex-President Theodore Roosevelt the leader of the battle for judicial
recall while the defenders of the judiciary were led by President
Taft. Taft, like Jefferson, was of different minds at different times
on the subject of retirement of the judiciary upon reaching a specified
age. While President he favored such a retirement plan; after the
became Chief Justice he was opposed to it.
Attorney General Cummings relied on Taft's position as the basis
for a suggested constitutional amendment in 1938. His belief in the
need for constitutional amendment to effect an age limit on the
office is emphasized by the fact that he suggested a legislative remedy
for voluntary retirement with compensation: 66
85

6 MEmSAG s AND PAPERS OF THE PRiEsDNTs 643, 691 (Richardson ed. 1900).

66 1938 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 5.
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Former President Taft asserted that the failure of the Constitution to provide for the compulsory retirement of Federal
judges at the age of 70 was a defect which should be remedied. This view is held by a large number of eminent jurists
and lawyers. It is also, I believe, in accord with the majority
opinion of our people. So many disadvantages have resulted
from the existing system that I do not pause to enumerate
them. Of course, provision should be made for full pay upon
such retirement. I, therefore, recommend the adoption of a
constitutional amendment to accomplish the desired result.
By its express terms such an amendment should be made
applicable only to those appointed after its adoption.
In addition, some statutory provision (presumably on a
pro rata basis) should be made for voluntary retirement of
Federal judges who have become disabled prior to reaching
the age of 70. Not infrequently instances of this kind have
occurred. Such a situation is unfair to the incapacitated judge
and detrimental to the public interest.
The limitations on legislative power to control the judiciary were
also revealed in the choice of remedies made by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt in his famous-or infamous-court-packing plan. It was
thought that the plan derived from Attorney General McReynolds'
67
report for 1918. McReynolds' recommendation had stated:
Judges of the United States Courts, at the age of 70, after
having served 10 years, may retire upon full pay. In the
past, many judges have availed themselves of this privilege.
Some, however, have remained upon the bench long beyond
the time when they were capable of adequately discharging
their duties, and in consequence the administration of justice
has suffered. . . . I suggest an act providing that when any
judge of a Federal court below the Supreme Court fails to
avail himself of the privilege of retiring now granted by
law, that the President be required, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to appoint another judge, who would
preside over the affairs of the court and have precedence over
the older one. This will insure at all times the presence of
a judge sufficiently active to discharge promptly and adequately the duties of the court.
As I have already pointed out, the Reconstruction Congress had anticipated McReynolds. There is some irony in the fact that this propo67 1913 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 5.
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sal, so roundly defeated in Congress when it related to the Supreme
Court, was later revived with regard to lower court judges in the
Attorney General's Reports for 1956 and 1958 and was enacted into
law by Congress and is now to be found in 28 U.S.C. § 372(b).
My final reference to the position taken by the executive on the
questions before the Tydings Committee is Attorney General Biddle's
support of the constitutionality of the Sumners bills that were treated
8
above,
IV. CONCLUSION
Largely on the basis of the materials set out or referred to herein,
I am quite convinced that it would be unconstitutional for the Congress to attempt, by legislation, to establish a fixed term of office for
judges of the federal constitutional courts. I am also of the opinion
that the greater weight of authority lies on the side of lack of power
to establish a mode of trial other than by impeachment for the removal of federal judges. And, for me, it follows that legislative action
spelling out the content of "good behavior" for such trials would also
be invalid, for the content of those words are either (1) to be derived
from the definition of high crimes and misdemeanors, or (2) to be
left to the discretion of the Senate when sitting as a court of impeachment. But on these latter questions, no one should claim certainty. And
it must be conceded that a determination by Congress that legislation on one or both of these latter points is constitutional should
weigh heavily in favor of its validity if the issue comes to judicial
scrutiny. My understanding about the need for constitutional amendment to effect a change in life tenure is buttressed by the repeated in69
troduction in both Houses of Congress of amendments to that end.

Especially in the absence of a weighty factual demonstration of
the need for legislation providing for removal of federal judges by
means other than impeachment-a case that has not been made and,
I think, cannot be made-I should favor treatment of the alleged
problems of judicial tenure by constitutional amendment. This was
the choice made for resolution of the problem of presidental succession. This is the choice being made for cure of the alleged evils of the
electoral college against claims for judicial revision. This should be
68 Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate on H.R. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-39 (1941).
69 The policy arguments on this issue are extensively set out in Hearings on S.J. Res.
44, HR. J. Res. 194, and H.R. J. Res. 91, Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11 (1954); Hearings on S.J. Res. 44 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11 (1954).
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the means for dealing with the issue of judicial removal. We have
here no threat of majority imposition on the rights of minorities
through constitutional amendment. We have here, instead, a proposal to effect a change in the structure of government that most
people would, with some reason, regard as a fundamental revision
of our constitutional system. If a case can be made for it, I can see
no reason for failing to take the issue to the people.
It should be kept in mind that the provisions for securing the
independence of the judiciary were not created for the benefit of the
judges, but for the benefit of the judged. It is not in the keeping of
the judges to surrender this independence under pressure or voluntarily to give it away. Judicial independence is held in trust for the
people and only they should determine whether they would like to
exchange some judicial independence for more judicial efficiency.

